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Learning From Today’s Wars

Lessons from the Air Campaigns over Libya,
Syria, and Yemen
Ben Nimmo
© 2016 Ben Nimmo

Abstract: The international air campaigns over Libya, Syria, and
Yemen offer lessons for the planning of future interventions. Planners and politicians must acknowledge hostile targets will evolve
over time, and it is impossible to prevent civilian casualties entirely.
They should accept the likelihood every action will be filmed and
posted online, and they should plan for post-conflict reconstruction
as rigorously as they plan for conflict.

T

he past five years have seen four major air campaigns conducted
by foreign powers in the Middle East: The NATO-led mission
over Libya, the US-led mission against ISIL over Iraq and Syria,
the Russian mission to support President Assad in Syria, and the Saudiled campaign over Yemen.
While these interventions differ significantly in their focus, conduct,
and participation, they offer a number of lessons for the political and
military leadership of the United States and other Western nations. These
lessons are particularly important to the political preparation of military
operations and to the sustainment of political support over the long
term. As such, it is vital for the military to factor them into planning
and to communicate them to political leaders. The five key lessons are:
1. The likelihood of “target creep,” in which air strikes expand to an
ever-growing list of target types;
2. The likelihood of “force evolution,” in which new types of assets
are brought into theater to accelerate an apparently slow-moving
campaign;
3. The inevitability of civilian casualties;
4. The new information environment created by observers on the ground
equipped with smartphones, cameras and satellite imagery; and
5. The need for a coherent post-conflict reconstruction plan focused
on providing immediate civilian services—“shoes on the ground” to
accompany “boots on the ground.”

Target Creep

The international campaign over Libya began on March 19, 2011. Its
authority was United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, which
authorized UN members “to take all necessary measures...to protect
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civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.”1 For the
first 12 days, the operation, dubbed “Odyssey Dawn” (OOD), was
conducted by a coalition of the willing, led and enabled by the United
States, together with Britain and France; from March 31 onwards,
NATO took over the command of the operation, renamed “Unified
Protector”’ (OUP). The operation formally concluded on October 31,
2011. The author of this article was a NATO press officer throughout
the operation.
Militarily, the conflict can be divided into four phases. The first
week of Operation Odyssey Dawn was marked by the rapid destruction
of Gaddafi regime armored columns by high-tempo air and cruisemissile strikes, lifting the immediate threat to the key rebel stronghold
of Benghazi.2 The assumption of command by NATO and the launch of
OUP coincided with a prolonged period of predominantly urban fighting along relatively static front lines; during this period, NATO was
accused of having fallen into a stalemate.3 This second phase endured
until late July when the forces opposed to Gaddafi broke out of their
strongholds and advanced on the capital, Tripoli, with a speed that surprised OUP’s commander.4 Following the fall of Tripoli, the final phase
was marked by a gradual reduction in the tempo of combat, until by
October, OUP was conducting only half as many sorties per day as it
had in April—approximately 80 per day, against a peak of almost 150.
OUP units clearly possessed overwhelming technological superiority over Gaddafi forces: in seven months of operations, not one
Operation Unified Protector casualty was caused by enemy action. It
was, moreover, unprecedentedly precise: Out of more than 6,000 airstrikes, five were confirmed as having resulted in civilian casualties (a
subject to which we shall return). It is, therefore, worth asking how
Gaddafi’s forces managed to keep their own campaign going so long.
They did so by adapting their tactics, improvising weapons systems
and supply points, and hiding among the civilians whom OUP was
intended to protect. One very early adaptation was the decision to disperse tank formations and instead mount heavy weapons on pick-up
trucks—known as “technicals”—which were largely indistinguishable
from civilian and rebel vehicles, which were easier to conceal in urban
areas. According to NATO Chief of Allied Operations Brigadier General
Mark Van Uhm at a press conference on April 5, 2011:
They more and more are using trucks, light vehicles, to move the operational to the front line and (...) they are keeping, as we military call it, their

1      For full text of resolution, see “Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya,
Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5
Abstentions,” UN Press Release, March 17, 2011, http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.
doc.htm.
2      For a more detailed overview, see Christopher S. Chivvis, “Strategic and Political Overview of
the Intervention,” Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2015), 23.
3      See Shashank Joshi, “Stalemate in Libya: Will Advisers and Drones Tip
the Balance?” April 23, 2011, RUSI Commentary, https://rusi.org/commentary/
stalemate-libya-will-advisers-and-drones-tip-balance.
4      See comments made by COM OUP Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard to the Atlantic
Council of the United States, February 14, 2012, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/transcripts/
coalition-building-and-the-future-of-nato-operations-2-14-2012-transcript.
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more heavy equipment, like tanks and other stuff, armored vehicles, in their
second echelon.5

The effect of this adaptation was exacerbated by NATO’s own capability limitations. In the early days of OUP, intelligence, surveillance,
targeting acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) assets were limited
both in number and in the amount of time they could spend over Libya,
rendering an already complex problem even more challenging:
Target development was difficult. Previous analysis on the country was
out of date (some targets were ten years old or more) and there were few
dedicated ISTAR assets in the air over the country, which meant that there
was little to develop target packages from. (...) This lack of intelligence and
real-time dedicated ISTAR feeds, more than the lack of combat or tanking
assets, was a limiting factor for NATO forces wishing to attack targets,
owing to difficulties in distinguishing between loyalist and rebel forces on
the front line.6

Simultaneously, Gaddafi’s forces dispersed their supply lines. At the
start of the conflict, their logistics had been based on hardened bunkers;
these were readily identified by aerial reconnaissance. In reaction to this,
Gaddafi’s forces increasingly moved their supplies to civilian buildings,
making them harder to locate and to strike, and increasing the danger
to civilians.
The result of these tactical shifts was to force what could be called
“target creep” on OUP’s targeteers: As the supply of first-choice targets
dwindled, either because they had been destroyed or because they had
been relocated to areas where it would be risky to strike them, the OUP
commander was forced to shift the air strikes to other target types
in order to generate a continued effect. For example, in April OUP
destroyed more than twice as many tanks as technicals: 62 tanks, 24
technicals. By June, the Gaddafi forces’ tactical shift meant this ratio
was reversed: Technicals accounted for 115 hits over the course of the
month, more than double the 53 tanks struck.7
Other targeting figures tell a similar story. In April, the brunt
of OUP’s firepower was directed at the Gaddafi forces’ ammunition
dumps: 351 were hit that month. But the regime forces’ rapid adaptation,
together with OUP’s own initial success, meant the ensuing months saw
drastic drops in the number of ammunition stores struck— just 44 hits
in June. To maintain the pressure, OUP’s targeting switched to vehicle
storage facilities: having struck just five in April, air strikes hit 75 in May,
severely degrading the Gaddafi forces’ ability to operate their vehicle
fleet. Soon, however, vehicle storage facilities, too, grew harder to find:
In June, only 20 were struck. Instead, the focus turned to command and
control. Command and control facilities accounted for just 11 strikes
in April, 56 in May, and 57 in June. Throughout the campaign, indeed,
OUP shifted the focus of its targeting repeatedly—partly because of
5      For the full transcript, see “Press Briefing on Libya,” NATO Press Office, April 6, 2011,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_72027.htm?selectedLocale=en.
6      Elizabeth Quintana, “The War from the Air,” in Short War, Long Shadow: The Political and Military
Legacies of the 2011 Libyan Campaign (London: RUSI Whitehall Report, 2012), 36, https://rusi.org/sites/
default/files/201203_whr_short_war_long_shadow_0.pdf.
7      All figures for NATO operations are based on NATO’s operational media updates,
archived at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_71994.htm.
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its own early success, but partly because of the Gaddafi forces’ tactical
changes.
Political demands also played a role. The apparent lack of progress
in the campaign created both tension and frustration in NATO capitals,
with the UK government being “particularly open in pushing for an
expansion of the target list to include more of Gaddafi’s military and
civilian infrastructure.”8 OUP’s targeting creep was, thus, the outcome
of tensions between the political imperative to protect civilians, and the
political imperative to show quick results.
The same is true of the US-led Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR)
in Iraq and Syria, though it is a conflict of a different nature. OUP was
pitted against a national army, with all the logistical and command and
control structures that implies: OIR is pitted against the terrorist group
ISIL, which is much more fluid and fast-moving, and holds less in the
way of heavy armor and artillery. However, the campaign has seen a
comparable target creep. As in Libya, the initial early successes proved
difficult to sustain: Two months after fighting began, the Department of
Defense issued a statement explaining why its momentum had slowed.
Entitled “Airstrikes Causing ISIL to Change Tactics,” and quoting thenPentagon spokesman Rear Admiral John Kirby, it described a situation
familiar to all those who had followed the Libyan campaign:
Not surprisingly, they have gotten better at concealment. Before the airstrikes…they pretty much had free rein. They don’t have that free rein
anymore, because they know we’re watching from the air.9

The United States struck; ISIL adapted; the United States adapted
too. Throughout 2015, OIR showed a pattern of target creep, shifting
the focus of its strikes to compensate for ISIL tactical changes. By
December 2015, Kirby, now a State Department spokesman, was able
to characterize the progress:
When we first started flying airstrikes, what were we hitting? Convoys—
right—vehicles, artillery positions, defensive positions, then they changed
the way they operated. They’re more in the cities, they’re not out there as
much, and so we changed and started hitting more urban targets that we
could—that we knew we could be precise at, and now there’s a focus on
this oil smuggling. But they have adapted the way they operate, the way they
finance themselves; we have to keep adapting as well.10

The targeting creep continued into 2016 as the United States stepped
up the pressure, especially after the ISIL terrorist attacks in Paris and
Brussels. By February 2016, the United States had “slowly built up its
airpower to the point where it can play a role in attacking (ISIL) at every
level from its top leadership to its forces in the field and fundraising
activities in the rear.”11 As we shall see, this progressive build-up of air
power is itself an important lesson of the campaigns over Libya and

8      See Chivvis, p. 33.
9      “Airstrikes Causing ISIL to Change Tactics,” DOD Press Release, October 3, 2014, http://
archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=123337.
10      State Department Daily Press Briefing, December 7, 2015.
11      Anthony H. Cordesman, “Creeping Incrementalism: US Forces and Strategy in Iraq and
Syria from 2011 to 2016: An Update,” CSIS, February 1, 2016, https://www.csis.org/analysis/
creeping-incrementalism-us-forces-and-strategy-iraq-and-syria-2011-2016-update.
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Syria. However, it also demonstrates the extent to which the target list
progressively crept outwards to take in a wider range of ISIL targets.
Thus, both the Libyan and Syrian experiences show target creep is
an integral part of air campaigning. It can be driven by the opponent’s
adaptation and domestic political considerations; it can be the result of
initial successes in depleting a given target category. It is not, of itself,
a negative phenomenon. It can prove so if it exposes friendly forces
or civilians to greater risk; but it is an inherent component of air-toground warfare. Political and military planners who envisage any future
air interventions would do well to bear that in mind as they plan, and
communicate, their campaigns.

Force Evolution

A related phenomenon in these campaigns has been that of “force
evolution,” in which new weapon platforms and forces are brought into
action to accelerate apparently slow-moving campaigns.
Both the Libyan and Syrian campaigns bear witness to this tendency.
In Libya, for example, the bulk of the initial air strikes were carried out
by cruise missiles and high-flying, fixed-wing aircraft deploying explosive precision munitions. However, even before Operation Odyssey
Dawn handed on the command to Operation Unified Protector, the
United States added A-10 Thunderbolts and AC-130 Spectre gunships
“to further enhance coalition capabilities against regime forces on the
ground.”12
Additional shifts followed the handover to Operation Unified
Protector. First, in late April, NATO aircraft began dropping nonexplosive concrete bombs—allowing aircraft to strike armored
vehicles in densely built-up areas while minimizing the risk to civilians.13 Simultaneously, the United States agreed to provide two Predator
drones for strike missions (they had conducted strikes during Operation
Odyssey Dawn, but returned to a surveillance role under Operation
Unified Protector.)14 A month later, Britain and France deployed attack
helicopters, with Bouchard explaining they could “pinpoint exactly these
vehicles that are much more difficult to see from high altitude.”15 The
deployment was “perceived by some to be a ‘game changing’ development, not only because of the precision it could deliver ashore, but also
because of the way in which its operation appeared to have a coercive
effect on Libyan forces disproportionate to its actual capability.”16 In
August, meanwhile, Operation Unified Protector’s warships—primarily
deployed to conduct the UN-mandated arms embargo—moved inshore
to deliver naval gunfire against regime positions.17 In each case, adding a

12      See Chivvis, p. 23.
13      See, for example, “France Dropping Concrete Bombs in Libya,” Defense Tech, April 29,
2011, http://www.defensetech.org/2011/04/29/france-using-concrete-bombs-in-libya/.
14      See Chivvis, p. 31.
15      From “Press Briefing on Libya,” NATO Press Office, May 27, 2011, http://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natohq/opinions_74826.htm?selectedLocale=en.
16      See Lee Willett, “Don’t Forget About the Ships,” in Short War, Long Shadow: The Political and
Military Legacies of the 2011 Libyan Campaign, 45.
17      See “Press Briefing on Libya,” NATO Press Office, August 9, 2011, http://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natohq/opinions_77137.htm?selectedLocale=en.
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new capability was intended to break a perceived deadlock, and accelerate the progress of the campaign.
Operation Inherent Resolve has seen a similar pattern. The
operation opened fire on August 8, 2014 when US F/A-18s dropped
500-pound laser-guided bombs near Erbil in Iraq.18 Initial strikes, again,
were largely from fixed-wing aircraft and drones. Once ISIL adapted
and became better at concealment, the decision was taken to adapt the
US force posture in reply; as Kirby put it, “Everybody paints them as
this great adaptive, capable, agile enemy. We’re pretty adaptive, capable
and agile ourselves.” Sure enough, two days later the mission saw its first
combat deployment of attack helicopters.19
Since then, OIR’s forces have steadily evolved. In mid-November
2014, A-10 Thunderbolts joined the operation; in August 2015, Marine
Corps Harriers joined; in the fall of 2015, A-10s and F-15s were deployed
to Turkey to support Kurdish and Arab fighters; in April 2016, B-52
Stratofortresses were deployed to the region, with US Central Command
saying the deployment “demonstrates our continued resolve to apply
persistent pressure on (ISIL) and defend the region in any future
contingency.”20
At the same time, OIR had seen a steady increase in the number
of US personnel on the ground. Initially billed as a “no boots on the
ground” operation, it grew steadily from the original estimated 450
troops, with 130 “assessors” ordered to Iraq in mid-August 2014, 475
troops added on September 10, 2014, an authorization to deploy up to
1,500 more troops on November 7, 2014, an authorization to deploy
a “modest” 450 in June 2015, and a warning from General Joseph
Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in March 2016 that he
and Carter “both believe that there will be an increase to the US forces
in Iraq in the coming weeks.”21 As the troop numbers grew, so their
role expanded, from “assessors” at the beginning of operations, to the
revelation in March 2016 that US Marines had established a fire base
near Makhmour in Iraq—a deployment that was only revealed when
18      See “US Aircraft Conduct Targeted Airstrike in Northern Iraq,” DOD Press Release, August
8, 2014, http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122879.
19      See “Isis Air Strikes: US Brings in Apache Helicopters as British Jets Target Militants in Iraq,”
The Independent, October 8, 2014, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-airstrikes-british-jets-carry-out-latest-attack-on-militants-in-iraq-9777284.html.
20      See “A-10 Performing 11 Percent of Anti-ISIS Sorties,” Defense News, January 19, 2015, http://
www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2015/01/19/a10-strikes-isis-11-percent/21875911/;
“Essex Amphibious Ready Group and 15th MEU Support Operation Inherent Resolve with
Harrier Strikes,” US Navy Press Release, August 18, 2015, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.
asp?story_id=90661; Anthony H. Cordesman, “Creeping Incrementalism: US Strategy in Iraq and
Syria from 2011 to 2015,” CSIS, November 9, 2015, http://csis.org/files/publication/151109_
Cordesman_Incrementalism_iraq_syria.pdf; and “B-52 Stratofortress Joins Coalition Team,” US
Central Command Public Affairs Office, http://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/
Article/717091/b-52-stratofortress-joins-coalition-team.aspx.
21      “President Sends More Assessors to Iraq,” DOD Press Release, August 13, 2014,
http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122911; “US Sending 475 More Service
Members to Iraq,” DOD Press Release, September 10, 2014, http://archive.defense.gov/
news/newsarticle.aspx?id=123127; “President Authorizes Additional Troops for Counter-ISIL
Effort,” DOD Press Release, November 7, 2014, http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=123595; “US to Deploy Modest Increase in US Troops to Iraq,” DOD Press
Release, June 10, 2015, http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=129019; and
“Dunford: More US Troops May be Needed in Iraq to Support Counter-ISIL Forces,” DOD
Press Release, March 25, 2016, http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/705517/
dunford-more-us-troops-may-be-needed-in-iraq-to-support-counter-isil-forces.
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they suffered their first casualties.22 This pattern of force evolution and
extension is expected to continue.23
Throughout this process, the question has been raised whether
such incremental deployments constitute “mission creep” (a term the
Pentagon has taken pains to rebut); however, it is rather a form of evolution.24 Conflict is not a static process, but a dynamic one: offensive
measures inspire defensive countermeasures, which trigger offensive
counters in their turn. The decision to introduce new weapon systems
or new forces into the theater of operations is a militarily rational one
designed to break an apparent deadlock; it can be politically necessary
to generate more rapid progress and to sustain democratic support.
However, it is a phenomenon that is seldom accorded the attention it
deserves in the political build-up to the launch of operations. Politicians
who call for future military interventions need to accept that force evolution will be an integral part of any campaign; it falls to the military to
communicate this to them.

The Certainty of Civilian Casualties

Planners must also consider the issue of civilian casualties ahead
of time. The lesson of the air campaigns in Libya, Syria, and Yemen
is that claims of such casualties are not only likely, but inevitable—
especially when the campaign is against an enemy who makes a policy
of hiding forces in civilian areas.
OUP faced such claims from the outset. As soon as the campaign
began, the Gaddafi regime started accusing NATO of causing massive
civilian deaths. The great majority of these claims were disproven after
the conflict was over, and NATO was credited with a “demonstrable
determination” to protect civilians:
The target engagement approval process was constructed so as to minimize
civilian risk. This required that the target be positively identified, that it
met the rules of engagement and legal criteria, and that the envisaged collateral damage was acceptable. This last factor tended toward the use of
smaller weapons with a smaller blast effect. More than 80 percent of the
air-launched weapons used by the coalition were in the 500-pound class or
less. The lethal radius of a 500-pound weapon is less than half that of a
1,000-pound class bomb.25

Despite all this care, however, the UN-mandated inquiry identified five OUP strikes that caused civilian deaths while hitting targets
that appeared to have been mis-identified as command and control and
staging areas.26 This outcome is especially significant, because the mis22      For a discussion of the military imperative behind the deployment, see Mark F. Cancian,
“Helping the Kurds in the Recapture of Mosul,” CSIS, April 5, 2016, http://csis.org/publication/
helping-kurds-recapture-mosul.
23      Kenneth M. Pollack, “Iraq Situation Report, Part I: The Military Campaign Against
ISIS,” Brookings Institution, March 28, 2016, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/
posts/2016/03/28-military-campaign-against-isis-pollack.
24      See “Kirby: Mosul Dam Operation Not ‘Mission Creep,’” DOD Press Release, August 19,
2014, http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122963.
25      See report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, March 2, 2012, para.
85, https://archive.org/stream/324151-bengali-un-libya/324151-bengali-un-libya_djvu.txt; ICIL
Report, Executive Summary; and Douglas Barrie, “Libya’s Lessons: The Air Campaign,” Survival:
Global Politcs and Strategy December 2012-January 2013 54, no. 6 (December 1, 2012), 63.
26      ICIL Report, paras. 86 and 88.
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identification appears to have been, in itself, a result of the Gaddafi
forces’ tactical decision to relocate to civilian areas: Thus, the same
tactical changes which forced target creep on OUP also forced it into
targeting choices that placed civilians at greater risk. Meanwhile, on
June 19, 2011, a precision-guided weapon appeared to malfunction and
killed a number of civilians.27 These incidents mean that roughly one
strike for every 1,000 resulted in civilian deaths; a better record than
any campaign in recent history achieved, but still not enough to prevent
civilian deaths altogether.
In Syria and Iraq, too, the coalition’s actions have caused a number
of civilian deaths. For example, in November 2014, an air strike killed
two children near Harim city in Syria; another in mid-2015 killed four
civilians at an ISIL checkpoint.28 Other sources have put the death rate
far higher. In late November 2015, the UK-based Syrian Observatory
for Human Rights reported that the coalition campaign had killed 250
civilians.29 As with OUP, these cases concern a tiny proportion of the
total number of strikes conducted; but just as in OUP, all the coalition’s
care has been insufficient to prevent them completely.
This is especially important, because Western tolerance of civilian
casualties is lower than it ever has been: During the Libyan operation,
for example, it was observed that “Nothing could have derailed the
operation so quickly in the minds of a non-committal public at home,
and of Libyans themselves, than civilian casualties among those the
operation was explicitly mandated to help.”30
The implications of this refusal to accept civilian deaths become clear
from the Saudi-led campaign in Yemen. The campaign, which began in
March 2015, has come at a high diplomatic cost for the Saudi government, largely due to the toll it has taken on civilian lives. The campaign
has been punctuated by credible and well-researched reports of civilian
deaths: Amnesty International enumerating 110 deaths in October 2015;
the United Nations reporting another 62 in December 2015; a single
strike in March 2016 killing over 100 civilians at a market.31 The profligacy has led to a chorus of condemnation in the West, with the Saudi-led
campaign being described by mainstream media as “savage,” and “a

27      See “Press Briefing on Libya,” NATO Press Office, June 21, 2011, http://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natohq/opinions_75652.htm?selectedLocale=en.
28      “Syria Crisis: ‘Children Died’ in US Air Strike,” BBC News, May 22, 2015, http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32840132; and “Centcom Investigation: 4 Civilians Killed
at ISIL Checkpoint,” DOD Press Release, November 20, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/
News-Article-View/Article/630801/centcom-investigation-4-civilians-killed-at-isil-checkpoint.
29      “US Coalition Strikes in Syria ‘Killed 250 Civilians,’” Al Jazeera, November 25, 2015, http://
www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/coalition-strikes-syria-killed-250-civilians-151124075241069.
html.
30      Michael Clarke, “The Making of Britain’s Libya Strategy,” in Short War, Long Shadow: The
Political and Military Legacies of the 2011 Libyan Campaign, 10.
31      “Yemen: ‘Bombs Fall From the Sky Day and Night:’ Civilians Under Fire in Northern
Yemen,” Amnesty International, October 7, 2015, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/
mde31/2548/2015/en/; “Yemen: Civilian Casualties Top 8,100 as Airstrikes and Shelling
Continues, UN Reports,” UN News Center, January 5, 2016, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.
asp?NewsID=52938#.VxAD4Mdll8c; and “Saudi-Led Coalition to Investigate Yemen Air Strikes,”
Al Jazeera, March 16, 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/saudi-led-coalition-investigate-yemen-air-strikes-160316071229274.html.
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fundamentalist dictatorship that’s bombing and killing civilians.”32 As
early as April 2015, a senior Obama administration official described
the diplomatic fallout as Saudi Arabia “getting a black eye internationally;” a year on, the campaign has come to be seen as “a humanitarian
catastrophe and a boon to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.”33 The
UK government has come under pressure to justify its arms sales to
Saudi Arabia, amidst accusations that it is abetting war crimes, and to
review its entire relationship with the kingdom.34
Amidst this welter of criticism, it is instructive to note, according to
a statement made by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid
Ra’ad Al Hussein on March 18, 2016, the Saudi-led coalition is responsible for two-thirds of the roughly 3,200 civilian deaths since the Yemeni
war began.35 This equates to roughly 2,000 civilian casualties over the
course of a year. This means the rate of civilian casualties caused by the
Saudi-led campaign over Yemen is, in fact, on par with, or slightly below,
that of the NATO operation over Kosovo in 1999 (an estimated 500
civilian deaths over two and a half months of bombing).36 This is not
to trivialize the extent of the suffering; any civilian death in combat is a
tragedy. It does, however, indicate the extent to which Western tolerance
for civilian casualties has receded over the past two decades.
In terms of the lessons to be applied from these campaigns, the
first, and most important, is clearly all possible steps must be taken to
prevent civilian casualties, even when the legal mandate is not specifically couched in terms of protecting civilians. The laws of war dictate
it, humanitarian principles demand it, and public opinion expects it.
However, the harsh reality of these campaigns is no countermeasures
have ever been enough to prevent civilian deaths completely. As such,
other responses are also necessary.
First, the military must make clear to its political leaders and to the
public from the outset that civilian casualties cannot be avoided, despite
all efforts to prevent them. Second, the military should enumerate the
principles it will follow to limit the danger to civilians. Here, operational
security will have to be taken into account, but this should not be exaggerated. A statement, for example, that all targeting is to be based on
the principle of “zero expectation of civilian casualties” and all munitions will be selected based on the principle of “lowest yield needed to
achieve the effect” will not give the opponent an insuperable advantage,
or endanger the lives of friendly personnel. Third, procedures should be
32      “Yemen War: Saudi Arabia’s Savage Air Strikes End, But the Crisis Remains,” The Independent,
March 17, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/yemen-war-saudiarabias-savage-air-strikes-end-but-the-crisis-remains-a6937466.html; and “Britain is at War with
Yemen. So Why Does Nobody Know About It?” The Guardian, January 28, 2016, http://www.
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jan/28/britain-war-yemen-saudi-arabia-military-advisers.
33      Quoted in the Wall Street Journal, “US Pressed Saudis to End Yemen Airstrikes,” April
22, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/houthis-advance-in-yemen-as-saudis-turn-to-negotiations-1429708217; and Bruce Riedel, ‘What the Yemen ceasefire means for the Gulf, the anti-ISIS
campaign, and U.S. security,’ Brookings Institution, 12 April 2016, http://www.brookings.edu/
blogs/markaz/posts/2016/04/12-yemen-ceasefire-us-security-riedel.
34      “Britain is at War with Yemen. So Why Does Nobody Know About It?” The Guardian,
January 28, 2016.
35      “Zeid Condemns Repeated Killing of Civilians in Yemen Air Strikes,” UNOHCHR
Press Release, March 18, 2016, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.
aspx?NewsID=17251&LangID=E.
36      See Human Rights Watch, “Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign,” February 2000,
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/Natbm200.htm#P39_994.
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put in place in advance to verify claims of civilian casualties, and to draw
the lessons from any incidents in which they are caused. And fourth,
compensation mechanisms for the victims and their families should be
established in advance.
In short, no efforts, and no technology, are sufficient to prevent
civilian deaths completely. The military should acknowledge that, and
plan and communicate accordingly.

From Smart Bombs to Smartphones

Target creep and force evolution are not, of themselves, new phenomena. By contrast, the fourth lesson of the air campaigns in the Middle
East—the presence of civilian observers with smartphones, laptops, and
access to satellite imagery—is revolutionary.
The importance of this factor cannot be overstated. Whereas in the
past, detailed information from the combat area generally only emerged
slowly, the communications revolution means it can surface within
minutes of a strike.
The presence of camera-enabled smartphones means any action—
from an air strike to a simple equipment move—not only can, but almost
certainly will, be filmed and posted online in near real time, probably
with its exact GPS coordinates.
The implications for military planning and communication are
enormous. At the basic level, soldiers who have their own smartphones
can compromise operational security and become a potential diplomatic
liability by posting indiscreet pictures of themselves online. Indeed, one
of the first indications Russia was planning action in Syria was a set of
social-media posts from members of the 810th Marine Division showing
them traveling to and posing in Syria in early September 2015.37 The risk
to security becomes particularly acute when the telephone camera in
question is GPS-enabled. The coordinates are then embedded in the
photo file, allowing viewers to identify where the picture was taken
almost to the square yard.38
Even if the troops on the ground can be persuaded not to post
selfies—in itself a challenge—anyone else with a camera and internet
access can quickly betray their presence. For example, as part of the
campaign against ISIL, the arrival in Libya of a team of 20 US commandos was revealed as soon as it reached the country when the Libyan
Air Force posted pictures of them on its Facebook page.39 Video footage
taken by civilians, meanwhile, has emerged as one of the main sources of
37      Ruslan Leviev, “Are There Russian Troops in Syria?” September 5, 2015, http://ruslanleviev.
livejournal.com/38649.html.
38      The seminal example of this technology in action remains the case of Bato Dambayev,
a Russian soldier deployed to Ukraine in February 2014. His selfie odyssey was chronicled
by Atlantic Council analysts in the report “Hiding in Plain Sight: Putin’s War in Ukraine,” May
2015, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/hiding-in-plain-sight-putin-s-war-inukraine-and-boris-nemtsov-s-putin-war; the locations of his selfies were given so accurately journalist Simon Ostrovsky was able to follow Dambayev’s traces and photo himself in exactly the
same locations. See Simon Ostrovsky, “Russia Denies That Its Soldiers Are in Ukraine, but We
Tracked One There Using His Selfies,” Vice News, June 16, 2015, https://news.vice.com/article/
russia-denies-that-its-soldiers-are-in-ukraine-but-we-tracked-one-there-using-his-selfies.
39      “Secret US Mission in Libya Revealed After Air Force Posted Pictures,” The Guardian,
December 17, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/17/secret-us-missionin-libya-revealed-after-air-force-posted-pictures.
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evidence for claims the Russian air force used banned cluster munitions
in Syria—leading to accusations of war crimes.40
Social-media posts have also become a key source of information
on events in Yemen. On January 6, 2016, for example, residents of the
al-Thiaba district in the capital Sana’a posted on Facebook a number of
images purporting to show cluster munitions which had been dropped
on the district; Human Rights Watch included it in a report on the use of
cluster munitions in the conflict.41 Western journalists have also turned
to social-media posts, with photographs and videos attributed to socialmedia users being used as evidence in reports.42
Even officially produced video imagery can have serious consequences for the conduct of the military campaign, and the political
process above it. The classic example of this is the series of cockpit camera
videos released by the Russian Defense Ministry between September 30
and October 12, 2015, at the very beginning of the Russian air campaign
in Syria. In all, 43 videos were released over this period, detailing what
the Ministry claimed was a series of precision strikes on ISIL forces.
However, a team of investigative journalists compared the Ministry’s
footage with freely-available satellite images of the terrain in Syria, and
pinpointed the genuine locations of the strikes. They concluded that the
Ministry’s claims betrayed “inaccuracy on a grand scale: Russian officials described thirty of these videos as air strikes on (ISIL) positions,
but in only one example was the area struck, in fact under the control
of (ISIL).”43 Open-source evidence, thus, rapidly disproved the Russian
claim it was focusing its strikes on ISIL, and was at least a contributing
factor in the failure of Russia’s diplomatic push to be recognized as a
partner in the fight against ISIL.
The implications for military planning are complex, because such
social-media posts are very much a double-edged sword. They can reveal
priceless information about an opponent’s location, readiness and assets;
they can betray information about one’s own forces to the opponent.
The security implications can only realistically be mitigated by a longterm campaign of awareness raising, aimed at creating a culture in which
soldiers on active duty view their phones (if they carry them at all) as a
liability to be managed. Similarly, the information-gathering potential
of social media will require large-scale investment into monitoring and
analysis if it is to be realized.
However, one factor can, and should, immediately be brought into
the military planning process, and that is the question of how, and to
what extent, combat camera footage should be made public. So much
40      See “Russia/Syria: Extensive Recent Use of Cluster Munitions,” Human Rights
Watch, December 20, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/20/russia/syria-extensiverecent-use-cluster-munitions.
41      The original post is online at https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=867
989619986503&id=100003264197140; and “Yemen: Coalition Drops Cluster Bombs in Capital,”
Human Rights Watch Press Release, January 7, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/07/
yemen-coalition-drops-cluster-bombs-capital-0.
42      See, for example, “Intense Clashes in Yemen Endanger Prospects of Humanitarian Ceasefire,” Washington Post, May 11, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/
yemen-rebels-claim-tribal-allies-downed-moroccan-warplane/2015/05/11/27e895c4-f7df-11e4a13c-193b1241d51a_story.html.
43      See Maks Czuperski, Eliot Higgins, et. al., “Distract, Deceive, Destroy: Putin at War in Syria,”
Atlantic Council of the United States, April 5, 2016, http://publications.atlanticcouncil.org/distractdeceive-destroy/. The author of this article contributed to the report.
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information can now be gleaned from imagery that future operations
will have no option but to frame an overall policy on its release. Such a
policy should answer three questions: 1) Should cockpit camera footage
be released at all? 2) If so, how will it be vetted before release, so it does
not inadvertently breach operational security requirements? 3) If not,
how will the inevitable public and media criticism be mitigated?
This is such a new field, and the technology itself is evolving so fast,
there are no easy answers. However, the experience of the Syrian campaign in particular shows the problems are only going to become more
complex, not less. As such, the smartphone problem must be included
in future planning—at the very least, to raise awareness that such a
problem exists at all.

Shoes (and Boots) on the Ground

The final lesson, and in many ways the most important, concerns the
period immediately after the end of hostilities—what could be termed
the “outbreak of peace.” This somewhat overly dramatic term is used
deliberately, because the lesson of the Libyan campaign is the initial
days after an air campaign are as crucial to long-term success as are the
initial days of the campaign itself. Western practice over the past two
decades has been to go into conflict with a massive weight of firepower
designed to overwhelm an opponent’s defenses and to destroy his ability
to conduct set-piece battles; the West needs to understand post-conflict
situations require a similarly massive effort—not just of boots on the
ground, but of shoes on the ground.
Libya is, in fact, a template of how not to conclude an intervention.
In purely military terms, the air campaign was a success: it delivered
effects on the ground with a very low rate of civilian casualties and
almost no casualties among its own personnel. The follow-up to the
campaign, however, was catastrophic—indeed, President Obama subsequently said “failing to plan for the day after” was probably the worst
mistake of his eight years in office.44 In a dizzying span of four and a
half years, Libya saw “a burst of political activity with the discovery of
newfound freedoms; a growing period of divisiveness over the pursuit
of political power and the spoils of war; an inability to form a cohesive
government to establish basic security and provide economic well-being
for a resource-rich country; the outbreak of civil war; and the ensuing
political chaos that gave space for Salafi jihadists and ultimately the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) to gain influence across the
country’s vast territory.”45
The experiences of Libya, Afghanistan, and Iraq show there is a
very narrow window of opportunity between the end of a campaign and
the beginning of a descent into chaos, a window that can be measured
in months, if not weeks. Initially, the end of large-scale combat leads
to euphoria and optimism; but that quickly crumbles under more basic
questions of governance, service and security—especially if the end of
44      “President Obama: Libya Aftermath ‘Worst Mistake’ of Presidency”, BBC News, April 11,
2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-36013703.
45      Ben Fishman, “Could Libya’s Decline Have Been Predicted?” Survival: Global Politics and
Strategy 57, no. 5, (September 22, 2015): 199-208, http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/
sections/2015-1e95/survival--global-politics-and-strategy-october-november-2015-3ec2/575-14-fishman-re-9997.

Learning From Today’s Wars

Nimmo

93

large-scale combat is followed by smaller skirmishes between armed
groups who have, perhaps, an interest in preventing the outbreak of
peace. In the words of Libya historian Dirk Vandewalle, “In Libya, the
ability to shape the political landscape and fill (the power) vacuum was a
race against time: a window of opportunity to restructure and refashion
political and social institutions before the disintegrative, centrifugal
forces of subnational or supra-national loyalties—whether tribal or geographical, linked to circles of patronage to Islamic movements—could
assert and consolidate themselves.”46
The practical challenges of rebuilding a functioning state, and building from scratch a more or less representative form of government, after
a conflict are enormous and immediate: They require everything from
the development of a constitution to the delivery of basic services such
as water supplies, sanitation, law enforcement, justice, and security. It is
no coincidence that ISIL’s propaganda has made much of its supposed
ability to provide services in the cities it has taken:
When ISIL takes over new territory, its first priority is restoring security
and basic services (primarily water and electricity) as quickly as possible.
In some areas, ISIL has even taken over bread factories to provide free or
subsidized food. Syrians I have interviewed in Turkey say that ISIL police
and courts initially try to build goodwill with the population by cracking
down on ordinary crime—thieves, murderers, drug dealers, and rapists are
the primary targets.47

The West has been lamentably slow in appreciating this fact; indeed,
in this area, the extremists appear to have learned faster. In Afghanistan,
for example, the Taliban profited significantly from the perception that
they were more capable of providing basic local services than was the
remote and apparently disengaged (not to say corrupt and ineffective)
central government in Kabul.48 It took almost a decade for the West to
acknowledge the need for improved local governance, and to introduce
its own strategy of “government in a box.”49 There are already warnings
that the errors of the past look likely to be repeated in present-day Syria
and Iraq:
Defeating ISIS will do little to bring regional security and stability if it is not
tied to efforts to deal with the broader sectarian and ethnic tensions in Iraq
and Syria, and to efforts to help the leaders in both states make reforms in
politics, governance, and economics that can bring recovery and broader
development (...) So far, however, the Obama administration has not even
articulated a clear set of options for helping Iraq and Syria deal with their
broader problems.50

The lesson must be applied. As repeated conflicts have shown,
the effort devoted to military campaigns needs to be matched in scale
46      Quoted in Fishman, pp. 203-204.
47      Mara Revkin, in “Experts Weigh In: Is ISIS Good at Governing?” Markaz Blog on Middle
East Politics and Policy, Brookings Institution, November 20, 2015. http://www.brookings.edu/
blogs/markaz/posts/2015/11/20-experts-weigh-in-isis-governance-revkin-mccants.
48      Thomas Barfield and Neamatollah Najumi, “Bringing More Effective Governance to
Afghanistan: 10 Pathways to Stability,” Middle East Policy 18, no. 4 (Winter 2010), http://www.mepc.org/
journal/middle-east-policy-archives/bringing-more-effective-governance-afghanistan-10-pathwaysstability.
49      Dexter Filkins, “Afghan Offensive is New War Model,” New York Times, February 12, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/13/world/asia/13kabul.html?_r=0.
50      Cordesman, November 2015, pp. 27-28.
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and sustainment by the effort to rebuild the provision of basic services
afterwards. Any future conflict intervention should include, from the
beginning, a plan for a post-conflict intervention aimed at providing
and sustaining basic services in the immediate aftermath of the conflict,
while a new national administration can be stood up. In most cases, it is
likely at least part of this post-conflict intervention will have to be carried
out by the military through a policy of “boots on the ground;” security is
the necessary foundation for reconstruction, and there are many circumstances under which only the military can realistically provide it. But this
should not be construed as meaning the job can or should be left to the
soldiers alone. The post-conflict intervention will most probably need
boots on the ground; but it will definitely also need shoes on the ground.
To be given the greatest chance of success, a post-conflict intervention
will need to plan for both—and how they will interact.
An integral part of any plan which includes an element of “shoes on
the ground” must also be an attempt to answer the question of who will
fill those shoes. Which local institutions, officials or groups will be able
to take on the burden of restoring governance to ungoverned spaces,
and how will civil peace be maintained in a post-civil-war situation? For
all the West’s failings in Libya, the country’s descent into civil war was
primarily driven by domestic factors: “The specific traits of the Libyan
people; their collective history under an impulsive and brutal 42-year
regime; and the scrum for power that Gaddafi’s demise unleashed in a
society that suppressed freedoms, ambitions, and even tribal and religious identities for decades.”51 Similarly, the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts
are deeply rooted in local antipathies which will have to be managed if a
further round of bloodshed is to be rendered less likely: “Even decisive
military success against (ISIL) is likely to prove ephemeral if there is
no plan (nor any effort to implement such a plan) to create a political
context where tactical military victories can be translated into enduring,
political achievements.”52
On a rhetorical level, at least, that message has begun to penetrate.
Speaking at the Manama Dialogue on security in October 2015, US
Deputy National Security Advisor Anthony Blinken underlined the
need for shoes on the ground, and for agreement on who should fill
them:
Ultimately, however, lasting peace and stability for the region cannot be
imposed from above, from the outside, or by force. They need to be built
from within by governments that are inclusive, accountable to their citizens,
and interconnected with the world. Security assistance alone cannot get governments there. It requires political accommodation to ensure the freedom,
dignity, and security for all citizens.53

Implementing the rhetoric, however, will require overcoming formidable obstacles; indeed, the “government in a box” strategy itself met
with, at best, mixed success in Afghanistan.54 An international postconflict intervention would be costly and lengthy; it would be dependent
51      Fishman, p. 200.
52      See Pollack, n. 32 above.
53      See the transcript of his remarks provided by the State Department at http://www.state.
gov/s/d/2015/249031.htm.
54      See, for example, Shashank Joshi, “The Afghan Endgame: Retrospect and Prospect,” RUSI
Commentary, July 2, 2010, https://rusi.org/commentary/afghan-endgame-retrospect-and-prospect.
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on local support and political goodwill, and upon the ability of local
actors to accept a power-sharing arrangement; it would depend for its
success on close cooperation between the military and a wide variety
of civilian actors, both local and international. It would have to rely
very largely on local bureaucracies and service provision, which would
in all probability demand a significant and sustained training effort; it
would have to reflect and respect local cultural norms, even when they
differ from Western ones; it would have to aim, as its ultimate goal, at
the creation of a cadre of local leaders and administrators capable of
providing basic services. These are immense challenges, and the West’s
record of success in this area is low.
However, the first step towards addressing such challenges is to
acknowledge they exist, and must be planned for at an early stage—
ideally, at the same time as military intervention is being considered.
This is a task in which the civilian and military leadership will have to
work together. They should consider, as early as possible, how basic law
enforcement, security and governance could be provided from the day
peace breaks out; they should consider what funding and assets may
be needed to ensure the delivery of basic humanitarian services such
as water, sanitation, food and healthcare; they should begin discussing,
and working towards, the legal framework for a post-conflict reconstruction project; they should begin analyzing the regional pattern of
relationships, in order to work towards regional support for the stricken
country; they should discuss how to train, recruit and retain local service
providers, so that any international reconstruction project can hand over
to local services. In brief, the civilian and military leadership should
work together on both the conflict and the post-conflict plans.
None of this will be easy, cheap, or quick; but the lesson of recent
interventions is it is necessary. Libya, in particular, is an object lesson in
how easy it is to win the war and then lose the peace. The ultimate goal
of the next intervention should be to win the peace as well.

